ABSTRACT AND INDETERMINATE things

 According to Hegel, objective moral reality obtains a fixed content, necessary for itself, which must be ABOVE OPINION and the SUBJECTIVITY OF ''INTENTIONS''. And the theory of duties, as it is objectively, must not be reduced to the empty principle of subjective morality which, on the contrary, DETERMINES NOTHING. Furthermore, discourses on virtue easily confine themselves to empty declamation because what is spoken of are ABSTRACT AND INDETERMINATE things, and also because such discourses only apply (selectively) to individuals, with their spurious and fictitious arguments and examples, such as subjective preference, tendency, vice, etc. Instincts also have in their origin the same content as virtues and duties, but since, then, such content depends on the immediate and unfiltered political will, on superficial and unreflective impressions, and has not yet risen to the determination of objective morality, what such instincts have in common with virtues and duties is only the abstract object which, DEVOID OF DETERMINATIONS, does not contain for them, within itself, the limit between GOOD and EVIL