Diplomatic ''process of totality''

 For example: the terms and conditions of the ceasefire in Syria that came into effect in September this year, negotiated between Kerry and Lavrov, were so precarious and ambiguous, so reticent and rancorous, that they had to be reviewed every 48 hours and were not even made public properly. Even more surprisingly tragic is the fact that it was ''broken'' by a US attack on Syrian forces that caused more than 60 deaths. No one believed the White House's hypothesis of error, and so the offensive to retake Aleppo with chemical weapons began. A few hours after the end of the truce, a UN convoy was bombed in the west of the city. The Russians and Al Assad were accused of the twenty deaths. Moscow used its veto power in the UN Security Council to block the French demand for a ceasefire.

The diplomatic “process of totality” is not taken into account in today’s world because there is absolutely no overall process conceived as a system; when there is no totality in the evaluation of a humanitarian crisis, in the human purposes that manage it, any conformity to the ends is only “useful appearances.” And it is not the increase in humanitarian awareness that is the end, but the intensification of the power in whose usefulness such awareness is included. The diplomatic means at the world’s disposal should not be taken as the supreme criterion of value, because this world is not an organism, but a chaos. The intellectual evolution of the parties, in this context, functions as a simple means of relative organization of an unsatisfactory state of affairs.