Nuclear Pinocchio

 Politics is undoubtedly a privileged place for lies. Hannah Arendt recalls it several times in Truth and Politics, insisting on the ravages of mass manipulation, given that the rewriting of history, the fabrication of overcognitive images is the property of all governments. The work of Jacques Derrida goes further, offering us a small philosophical story of lies. Since Aristotle, Heidegger, Saint Augustine, Rousseau and Kant have thought about the recourses of a conception of the lie that infers that the intention to lie is at the origin of a deceit or a mistake, which must be differentiated from a lie by error or from more uncertain or less desired ones that fertilize them. ambiguities of language. Kant, as is evident, rejects the supposed right to lie for humanity in the name of meta-legal principles.

And it is necessary, therefore, to dissociate veracity from truth from the beginning. When I hear it, I don't necessarily say it's false and I can say it's false without lying. This is a canonical example: Freud, in El Chiste, tells the following Jewish story that Lacan frequently cites: one says the other: «I go to Cracow», and it is true, tell the truth; but the other, who suspects that he is lying, says: ¿Pero ¿por qué me dices que te vas a Cracovia si te vas a Cracovia? In other words, this is an example where someone has tried to lie by saying something that is true. This allows us to dissociate the truthful from the truthful, the false from the lying. I can perfectly propose a false statement because I believe it is, therefore, with the sincere intention of telling the truth, and I cannot be accused of lying, but because what I say is false. However, if I say something that is true without thinking or with the intention of confusing someone who is listening to me, I stop. I lack the truth when I say something different from what I think. Missing the truth implies an intention to deceive others, to confuse them. Therefore, the lie implies the intention to deceive.